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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT -
CHARACTERIZATION OF STATUTE AS PENAL
Plaintiff, a creditor of an Arkansas corporation which had filed its
articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State but had failed
to file them, as required by Arkansas statute,' with the County Clerk
of the county in which its principal office in Arkansas was located,
brought action in a Tennessee state court against two Tennessee in-
corporators to hold them liable as partners for the corporate debt
owed according to the Arkansas Stockholders Liability statute.2
Held, Tennessee is not required to give full faith and credit to the
Arkansas law as it is penal in nature, and the rule of comity does
not apply because the Arkansas law is contrary to the law and public
policy of Tennessee. Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 261 S.W.2d 127
(Tenn. 1953).
It has long been recognized that the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution requires the enforcement of foreign judgments be-
tween the states of the Union.3 Not all judgments, however, are
entitled to enforcement when sued upon in a state other than the
rendering state.4 Huntington v. Attrill5 recognizes an exception in
the case of judgments which are based upon the penal law of the
rendering state. The authority of the Attrill case is somewhat dubious
in light of the more recent decision in Milwaukee County v. M. E.
White Co." which establishes the rule that the full faith and credit
clause requires a state to enforce judgments of a sister state based
upon a revenue claim. This case may well suggest that the same
rule applies to judgments based upon a penalty since the Court said
that recovery on a judgment may be resisted only on the following
grounds: (1) the rendering court was without jurisdiction, (2) the
obligation has been discharged, (3) the state of the forum has not
1. "Upon filing with the Secretary of State of articles of incorporation, the
corporate existence shall begin. Provided, however, a set of the Articles of
Incorporation (bearing the filing marks of the Secretary of State) shall be
filed for record with the County Clerk of the County in which the corpora-
tion's principal office or place of business in this State is located." Ax.
STAT. AWx. § 64-103 (1947).
2. Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1952).
3. Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 203 (1952).
4. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273, 56 Sup. Ct.
229, 232, 80 L. Ed. 220, 226 (1935); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642,
55 Sup. Ct. 589, 592, 79 L. Ed. 1100, 1107 (1935); Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 683, 684, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 234, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 1133 (1892).
5. 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892).
6. 296 U.S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 L. Ed. 220 (1935).
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provided a court competent to decide the case, and possibly, (4) the
judgment was procured by fraud.
It has only been in recent years that the Supreme Court has held
that the full faith and credit clause is applicable to statutes. 7 Thus
far the clause has been applied to only four types of statutes: stock-
holder's liability,8 fraternal benefit insurance,9 workmen's compensa-
tion,"" and wrongful death." The reasons for its application to the
first three types of statutes are twofold: the desire to enable the
parties to determine their rights and obligations at the time they
enter the contractual relation 2 (stockholder, insured, employee-em-
ployer) and the desire for uniform results of litigation irrespective
of the citizenship of the parties. In the case of a wrongful death
action there often is no prior contractual relationship between the
parties, and therefore, only the latter reason, that of uniformity, is
applicable. 3 Notwithstanding the applicability of the clause, the
statute may be denied enforcement if it is penal and there has been
no judgment rendered in the foreign state on the cause of action.14
The rule of the Milwaukee County case would be applicable only in
the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As the cause of action sued upon in the instant case is based upon
the Arkansas statute, and as this statute is one of the types-stock-
holder's liability-to which the full faith and credit clause has been
applied, the characterization rule established in Huntington v. Attril2
would be controlling. The court there said that a statute may be
characterized as penal in the international sense if its purpose is to
punish an offense against the public justice of the state rather than
to provide a remedy to the injured private person.'a It is doubtful
whether the claim in the instant case comes within this definition
of a penal claim. The Arkansas law in effect withholds a privilege,
that of limited liability, until the incorporators have done the acts
necessary to establish a de jure corporation. The remedy runs in
7. Note, 5 VAND. L. REV. 203, 204 (1952).
8. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749 (1912).
9. Order of United States Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586,
67 Sup. Ct. 1355, 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947).
10. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571,
76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932).
11. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951).
12. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100
(1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749
(1912); see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 984, 95 L. Ed.
1212, 1218 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
13. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 480, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951).
14. See Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 56 L Ed. 749'
(1912); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. td. 1123
(1892).
15. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673, 674, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 230,
36 L. Ed. 1123, 1130 (1892).
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favor of the creditor, not the state, is measured by his debt, and is to
him remedial.'0 It is, therefore, doubtful if this decision would stand
up upon review by the Supreme Court 7
The Arkansas statute did not expressly impose a partner's liability
for failure to comply with its terms; 8 the liability was imposed by
judicial construction of the statute.' 9 Whether enforcement of this
liability would amount to application of the full faith and credit
clause to the statute or to the opinion which indicates the effect of
the statute is a question which remains open. The extent to which
decisions construing a statute ought to be regarded as part of the
statute has not been determined by the Supreme Court and there is
little if any authority in point2
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - EXCEPTIONS - INTENTIONAL TORTS
Plaintiff entered -a veterans' hospital for an operation on his left
leg; while he was under anesthesia, the hospital employees mistakenly
and without consent operated on his right leg. Plaintiff brought suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence in performing the
unwanted operation and causing a delay in the necessary operation.
The Government moved for dismissal on the ground of lack of juris-
diction in the federal district court. Held, motion granted. The
claim arises out of assault and battery within the specific exceptions
to waiver of Government immunity. Moos v. United States, 22 U.S.L.
WEEK 2334 (U.S.D. Minn. Jan. 15, 1954).
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of governmental immu-
16. Id. at 676.
17. In an action involving the same Arkansas statute, defendant and issue
as the instant case, the United States District Court for Western District of
Tennessee held that the statute was not penal and would be enforced by the
federal courts sitting in Tennessee. The decision was affirmed by the court
of appeals. Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1953).
Subsequently the Tennessee Supreme Court decided the instant case. Defer-
ring to the state decision the court of appeals granted a petition for rehearing
and reversed itself. 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953). The reversal apparently
is based on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed.
1188 (1938). But since the primary question is the application of the full
faith and credit clause, there would seem to be a doubt whether the Erie rule
applied.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. See Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1952)
(defendants held individually liable as partners for the debts of the business
where, having filed articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State but
not with the county clerk, they did business under a corporate name).
20. Some reference to the problem may be found in Field, Judicial Notice
of Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 12 MN. L. RLV. 439,
441 (1928); Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional
Law? 15 Mn. L. REv. 161, 170 (1931); Note, 5 VAND. L. REV. 203, 205 (1952).
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nity from tort suits arising from the negligence of Government em-
ployees.1 It grants to federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions on claims for money damages as a result of property
damage or personal injury under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable under the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.2 Certain torts, characterized as
"deliberate," 3 have been excluded from this waiver of immunity by
Section 2680 (h) which provides that provisions of the Act "shall not
apply to ... (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with con-
tract rights."4 This exclusion of intentional torts is harmonious with
the provision that the United States shall not be liable for punitive
damages. 5
The Federal Tort Claims Act should be given a construction which
will accomplish the- legislative aim of relaxation of governmental
immunity from suit in negligence cases; but due regard should be
given to the exceptions, and courts must include only those circum-
stances which are within the words and reason of the exceptions.0
When presented with a claim, the theory of which may possibly fall
within one of the specific exceptions to the Act the court has three
possible alternatives: (1) to refuse to allow the claim if any possible
theory of recovery falls within the exceptions, (2) to allow the claim
if any valid theory can be found which does not fall within the ex-
ceptions, or (3) after closely scrutinizing the complaint in order to
arrive at the gravamen or essence of the action, to dismiss the case
if it arises directly out of one of the excepted torts.
As one of the latest in a recent series of cases interpreting Section
2680 (h), the instant decision falls within alternative (1) above, and
represents an extreme example of the construction of the exceptions
to the Federal Tort Claims Act in favor of the Government. Following
1. Gilroy v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 664 (D.D.C. 1953); Jefferson v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948); Englehardt v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b) (1950).
3. SEa. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A
Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1, 49 (1946). But cf. Jones v. United
States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953) (misrepresentation held to mean negligent
misrepresentation in light of the use in the same section of the word "deceit,"
which connotes intentional misrepresentation).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1950).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950). That the exclusion was intended to be limited
strictly to intentional torts, see Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1942), where it was de-
clared that "negligent assault" would not be included in 2680 (h).
6. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, '73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427
(1953); Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D. Puerto Rico 1951).
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Minnesota law,7 the court found that the performance of an operation
without consent of the plaintiff constituted an "assault and battery."8
It held that although the same acts might also constitute a sufficient
basis of recovery in a negligence action, "the mere existence of a
severable claim in negligence does not negative the existence of
assault and battery."9 Thus it would seem that under this decision
the provisions of 2680 (h) would not apply if the employees of the
Government were merely negligent in the intended surgery, whereas
the exception would apply if the negligence went even further so as
to give rise to a purely technical battery.'0 The case is questionable
in that recovery for a technical intentional tort will be barred, while
damages will be allowed for simple negligence; it creates an anomalous
situation in which the plaintiff tries to prove a slight breach of duty
while the Government attempts to show that its employees, though
acting within the scope of their employment, were guilty of an in-
tentional harm.
Duenges v. United States" is an example of a case where the court
sought to ascertain the gravamen of the action in determining whether
the theory of recovery falls under the exceptions of 2680 (h). There
plaintiff's complaint alleged injuries, among others, of loss of free-
dom, humiliation and loss of wages as a result of negligent mainte-
nance of records by the Army. Plaintiff had been arrested and tried
as a deserter when, in fact, he had received his honorable discharge.
In granting the Government's motion to dismiss, the court declared
that false arrest and imprisonment were the very "gist and essence"
of plaintiff's cause12 and that the claim was therefore excluded as
7. The courts are to follow the law of the site of the claim. Olson v. United
States, 175 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1949); Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r, 107 F.
Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1953). But there is some doubt as to whether state
or federal law controls where the courts must determine whether a specific
exception will apply. See Gottlieb, Conflicts and a Federal Common Law of
Torts, 7 VA='. L. REV. (1954).
8. Instant case, citing Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
9. Instant case, citing Nelson v. Nicollet Clinch, 201 Minn. 505, 276 N.W.
801 (1937). Other jurisdictions hold that an unauthorized operation performed
by mistake, though amounting to an assault and battery, is held to be mal-
practice or negligence. Estrada v. Orwitz, 75 Cal. App.2d 54, 170 P.2d 43
(1946) (dentist removed extra teeth); Bakewell v. Kahle, 125 Mont. 89, 232
P.2d 127 (1951); Physicians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash.2d 38, 111
P.2d 568 (1941).
10. United States v. Wilcox, 117 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), is another
case in which the court refused recovery because assault and battery were
involved. Plaintiff was injured when attacked by an insane inmate over
whom the hospital employees exercised negligent control. The claim was
disallowed as arising out of assault and battery. See also Lewis v. United
States, 194 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1952).
11. 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
12. Whether there was, in fact, a false arrest or imprisonment is open to
some doubt. See (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v. McCurdy, 251 S.W.2d 139 (Tein.
App. 1952), commented on in Wade, Torts, 6 VAND. L. REV. 990, 1006-11 (1953);
Wade expresses serious doubts as to whether there can be a claim for false
imprisonment based on a negligent act of the defendant.
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arising out of one of the excepted torts in Section 2680 (h) .13
Since 2680 (h) states that claims arising out of the enumerated torts
will be excluded from the operation of the Act, rather than that claims
of assault, battery and the other enumerated torts will be excluded,
it seems unlikely that any courts will go so far as to allow recovery
if any possible theory can be propounded which does not fall within
the expressed exceptions.14 Perhaps the best construction of Section
2680 (h) in terms of the effectuation of the general policy of the Act15
is to be found in the Duenges and similar cases. Wide acceptance of
the instant decision would seem to necessitate redefinition by Con-
gress of its purpose in passing Section 2680 (h) .16
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - INDEMNITY - EMPLOYEE'S
LIABILITY TO GOVERNMENT
The United States was sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries resulting from the negligent operation by one of its em-
ployees of a Government automobile. The Government impleaded
its servant as a third party defendant and prayed indemnity for the
full amount of its liability. Judgment was entered for the claimant,
and from a like judgment for the United States, the employee ap-
pealed. Held, reversed. The liability of a servant to his master for
a judgment suffered by the latter under respondeat superior is quasi-
13. For cases in which the court looks to the gravamen of the action in
determining the applicability of a 2680(h) exception, see Jones v. United
States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953) (plaintiff sought damages for loss on sale
of oil stock in reliance on misinformation by Geological Survey); United
States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950) (plaintiff sustained mental
injuries as a result of a verbal assault by Army sergeant); Fletcher v. Veterans
Administration, 103 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (plaintiffs' business
harmed by V.A.'s misstatement concerning their financial status). See also,
Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Mo. 1953);
Chambers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Kan. 1952).
14. But cf. Newman v. Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 41 N.W.2d 417 (1948),
in which plaintiff alleged injury as a result of defendant's act of pulling his
chair out from under him in jest. Defendant claimed the action was barred
by the one year statute of limitations aplying to intentional torts since the
claim was one of assault and battery. The court, in applying the negligence
statute, held that there was no element of "evil" intent, necessary for an
assault and battery. This court, at least, is inclined to allow any valid theory
which will support plaintiff's claim.
15. The concept of sovereign immunity is for the most part outmoded
and as far as it relates to the Federal Tort Claims Act, such immunity is
preserved only in those exceptions which the Act specifically provides.
Union Trust Co. of District of Columbia v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80,
84 (D.D.C. 1953).
16. An insertion of the word "directly" after the word "arising" so as to
have Section 2680(h) read "arising directly out of" would seem to accomplish
the desired result.
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contractual in nature. Since a judgment against the United States
under the Tort Claims Act bars any action by the claimant against
the employee, the Government, in paying the claim, is conferring no
benefit upon its employee for which to be indemnified.' Gilman v
United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953).
In rejecting the Government's plea for indemnity, the court reasoned
from the premise that the duty of an employee to compensate his
employer for damages sustained by judgment under respondeat su-
perior is founded on quasi-contract. 2 Assuming, arguendo, restitu-
tion to be the only possible theory of recovery, it is axiomatic that
the employer, in order to prevail, must show the receipt of a benefit
by his employee, the retention of which is unjust.3 Thereupon, with-
out reference to the assent of the employee, the law imposes the
obligation to make restitution.4 The right to compensation rests upon,
and is measured by, the benefit conferred upon the obligor, rather
than the damage sustained by the obligee.5
The principle is settled at common law that the master, upon satis-
fying a judgment suffered under respondeat superior, may recover
the amount of the judgment from the servant whose negligence occa-
1. The instant case and the recent case of Burks v. United States, 116 F.
Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953), raise for the first time the question of the Gov-
ernment's right to indemnify under the FTCA. The court in the Burks case,
holding that the United States was entitled to indemnity from its negligent
employee, said, "Where the Government, by statute, measures its primary
liability by common law standards, as though it were a private employer, it
does not require 'judicial legislation' to recognize and enforce other common
law incidents resulting from that relationship." Id. at 340.
2. The dissenting judge rejects the proposition that quasi-contract is the only
basis for recovery by the employer, citing Judge Cardozo's opinion in Schubert
v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 64 A.L.R. 293 (1928),
in which the action is said to be founded on breach of an independent duty
owed the master by the servant. The recent case of Jones v. Kinney, 113
F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953), like the Schubert case, involved a suit by a wife
against the employer of her husband for injuries sustained because of the
negligence of the husband within the scope of his employment. The employer
impleaded the servant and judgment was recovered by the employer by way
of indemnity for the amount of the judgment entered in favor of the claimant.
Both cases arose in jurisdictions in which the wife could not have success-
fully maintained the action against her negligent husband. Clearly recovery
cannot be predicated on the theory of unjust enrichment, because the master
in paying the judgment confers no benefit on his servant. Recovery was
based on the servant's breach of the duty to use due care in performing his
master's business, a duty implicit in the master-servant relationship. See
also Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Georgia S. & F. Ry. v.
Jossey, 105 Ga. 271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898); 1 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 29&
(2d ed. 1913); BATT, LAW OF MASTER AM SERVANT 158 (4th ed. 1950); HuFFcuT,
AGENCY 361 (2d ed. 1901); MEcHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 532 (4th ed. 1952) ;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 379 (1933).
3. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 7 (1913); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
1, comments a, b, c (1937).




sioned his liability.6 Similarly, if the master settles a claim arising
under respondeat superior, without resort to litigation, he is entitled
to indemnity in an amount not exceeding the actual damage sustained
by the claimant.
Analyzing the cases in terms of unjust enrichment, what is the
nature of the benefit conferred upon the employee which is the basis
for recovery in the private employer's suit for restitution? In the
final ,analysis, it is the release from legal liability resulting from the
payment by the employer of a claim for which the employee was
liable.8 The quasi-contractual action will lie, ordinarily, only after
payment of the claim, since a judgment against the master does not
of itself extinguish the servant's liability, and the servant, therefore,
is not unjustly enriched.9 Accordingly the cases stating the accepted
rule without expressing the reason therefor, emphasize the payment
of the claim as the operative fact which gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion' 0 This emphasis upon payment, rather than the change in the
servant's legal position resulting therefrom, is understandable since
prior to the FTCA the only operative fact which would effect such
a change was the payment of the claim.
The instant case involves, not the ordinary master-servant relation-
ship, but a Government employer-employee relationship; and the
6. Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199
N.Y. Supp. 9 (2d Dep't 1923); Scotney v. Wessaw, 56 Pa. D. & C. 551 (C.P.
1946); FERSON, PmNncniLms OF AGENCY § 131 (1954); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §
401, comment c (1933); RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); WOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS § 258 (1913); see Note, 110 A.L.R. 834 (1937).
7. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); 1 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT §
287 (2d ed. 1913); 20 A. & E. ENcY. LAW 51, 52 (1902). The measure of re-
covery in this type of case suggests the difficulty in calling the master's suit
based on unjust enrichment a suit for indemnity. The measure of damages,
i.e., the value of the benefit conferred, is improperly referred to as indemnity,
since the latter term denotes a recovery measured by the employer's loss.
The concepts, though antithetical, are often used interchangeably, and since
in most cases the benefit to the employee and the loss to the employer are
coequal, error seldom results.
8. "If the defendants had been prosecuted instead of the town, they must
have been held liable for damages, and from this liability they have been
relieved by the plaintiffs. It cannot therefore be controverted, that the plain-
tiff's claim is founded in manifest equity. The defendants are bound in
justice to indemnify them so far as they have been relieved from a legal
liability." Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24, 34 (1839),
cited with approval in Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161
U.S. 316, 327, 328, 16 Sup. Ct. 564, 40 L. Ed. 712 (1896). See also WOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS § 259 (1913).
9. See Merlette v. North & East River Steamboat Co., 13 Daly 114 (C.P.
N.Y. 1885); Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437, 81 Pac. 859 (1905); RESTATE-
inW-T, RESTInT ON § 96 (1937).
10. See, e.g., Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d 10 (1939);
Holbrook v. Nolan, 105 Ind. App. 75, 10 N.E.2d 744 (1937); Karcher v. Bur-
bank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E.2d 542 (1939); Hunter v. DeLuxe Drive-In
Theaters, 257 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. App. 1953); Frank Martz Coach Co. v. Hudson
Bus Transp. Co., 133 N.J.L. 342, 44 A.2d 488 (1945); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio 1945).
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difference is significant in at least one decisive respect. The federal
employer, under its sovereign prerogative, has provided that a judg-
ment against it "shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the
claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee
of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."''
Thus, under the FTCA a new operative fact, the suffering.of a judg-
ment by the Government, will have substantially the same effect on
the legal position of the Government employee as the payment of
the judgment would have on the legal position of the private em-
ployee. In both instances the employee is released from a liability
which as between the master and the servant rests primarily on the
latter. The release in the one case is accomplished by the suffering
of a judgment and in the other by the payment of a judgment. The
benefit in each type of case is conferred at different stages in the
proceedings, but the nature of the benefit in each case would seem to
be indistinguishable.
In the final analysis, the right of the United States to indemnity
must find sanction, either express or implied, in the statute!2 which
authorizes Governmental liability and in the policy considerations 3
implicit therein. It may be that in finally resolving the question,14
the Supreme Court will find support for the denial of indemnity in
the intent of Congress. Absent such intent, it would seem, the deci-
sion in the Gilman case to the contrary notwithstanding, that there
is no inadequacy in the common law dictating the result herein
achieved. 5
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2676 (1950).
12. The majority in the Gilman case offered as secondary reasons for deny-
ing recovery, inferences as to Congressional intent drawn from the legislative
history of the act. The court quotes from SEx. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1942), to the effect that exclusive Government liability is "just and
desirable" and that the employee tort-feasor should be "dealt with under
the usual disciplinary controls." The quoted material relates, however, not
to the 1946 Act, but to a 1942 Act concerning administrative settlement of
small claims. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2672 (1950). Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953), is cited for the proposition that the
Congress, in passing the 1946 Act, was influenced by the 1942 reports. The
court took notice of a comment made by former Asst. Att'y Gen. Shea, who,
in response to an interrogatory at the Congressional hearings prior to the
enactment of the 1942 Act indicated that the Government's only remedy
against the employee would be discharge. Instant case, 206 F.2d at 849.
13. The dissent considered the legislative intent to be insufficiently explicit
to be determinative, and found strong policy considerations for recovery in
the instant 'case in the fact that much of the litigation under the Tort Claims
Act involves automobile negligence cases in which the employee, driving his
private automobile, injures the claimant. The result in such cases, under
the instant decision, would frequently amount to the unjust enrichment of
the employee's insuror at the expense of the taxpayer. It is also suggested
that to deny indemnity is to invite carelessness by Government employees
and collusion with claimants. Instant case, 206 F.2d at 850.
14. See Blanton, Subrogation, Indemnity, Contribution and Election of
Remedies Aspects of FTCA, 7 VAmN. L. REv. (1954).
15. See 3 MooRs, FEDERAL PRAcricE 514 (2d ed. 1948). See also Comment,
56 YALE L.J. 534, 560 (1947).
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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - PARTIES - IMPLEADER AND JOINDER
In an action to recover for the accidental death of a longshoreman,
the defendant impleaded the United States,' seeking indemnity under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 The United States moved to dismiss
the third-party complaint on the ground that the defendant third-
party plaintiff had a remedy under the Suits in Admiralty Act.8
Held, motion denied. Although defendant has an action over in
admiralty for indemnity, he may utilize third-party practice which
was designed to assure disposition in a single suit of disputes with
common questions of law and fact. Skupski v. Western Nay. Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Impleader and joinder of the United States are not specifically
provided for in the FTCA, although sovereign immunity is waived
in sweeping language.4 The lower courts are sharply divided as to
whether the Act contemplates the United States being the sole de-
fendant,8 or whether there can be joinder6 or impleader.7 Some courts,
comparing the FTCA to the Tucker Act s where no joinder is per-
mitted,9 hold that there is no jurisdiction over a private defendant;
they state that an act waiving governmental immunity should be
strictly construed, pointing out that the possible procedural difficulty
1. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412 and
2671-80 (1950).
3. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 742 (1944).
4. "The United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances ..... " 28 U.S.C.A. §
2674 (1950). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950), provides that the district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction "where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." The liability is limited by thirteen exceptions.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1950).
5. That the United States must be the sole defendant: Sappington v.
Prencipe, 87 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 182 F.2d
102 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948);
Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948); Uarte v. United
States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d 110
(9th Cir. 1949); see Prechtl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W.D.N.Y.
1949).
6. Joinder permitted: Rivers v. Bauer, 79 Supp. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd,
175 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1949) (issue of joinder never raised; Englehardt v.
United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947); see Maryland v. Manor Real
Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D. Md.), rev'd on other grounds, 176
F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949); Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J.
1947).
7. Impleader permitted: Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.
1950), affd sub nom., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951);
Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Contra:
Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd,
340 U.S. 543 (1951).
8. 10 STAT. 612 (1855), as amended, 24 STAT. 505 (1887). See 28 U.S.C. §§
41(20), 250 (1946).




of the United States being tried by the judge' and the co-defendant
by a jury" indicates that it was not the Congressional intent that
there should be a co-defendant. The flexible procedures available
under the Federal Rules which alleviate possible procedural diffi-
culties are held inapplicable in determining the scope of jurisdiction,
since they may be applied only after jurisdiction is established. 13
Those courts permitting joinder construe the language of the FTCA
to be analogous to the Suits in Admiralty Act, where joinder'4 and
impleader 5 are permitted, and take jurisdiction as they would over
any private litigant since the Act does not expressly prohibit joinder.
Jurisdiction having been once established, the Federal Rules are
available to cope with any administrative difficulties that may be
encountered during the conduct of the joint trial.
Although the propriety of joinder has never been determined by
the Supreme Court, impleader was permitted in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co.16 The Court interpreted the Act liberally in favor
of waiver of the sovereign's immunity, since only under certain spe-
cific exceptions is the government unamenable under the Act for its
torts. 7 The procedural difficulties in trying the United States by the
court and the defendant third-party plaintiff by jury were found not
to be insurmountable. The Court referred to the analogous practice
of trying equitable issues by the court and legal issues by the jury, 8
and noted that the trial court could order separate trials under Rule
42(b)10 to prevent any injustice or inconvenience. Although the
Yellow Cab case is confined on its facts to impleader, the liberal in-
terpretation given to the FTCA by the Court seems to indicate that
joinder should be permitted.
10. "Any action against the United States under section 1346 of this title
shall be tried by the court without a jury." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2402 (1950).
11. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII; FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b) (separate trials can be ordered), 39(c) (advisory
jury).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (rules shall not be construed to extend the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts).
14. See Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730, 732 (E.D. Va. 1948).
'at has been almost common practice in recent years in this court to join in
a suit against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the mari-
time company or agency operating a merchant vessel under contract with the
United States." Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (D. Md.
1947) (no cases cited to support this proposition).
15. The Peerless, 2 F.2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); The Cotati, 2 F.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1923); Hildago Steel Co. v. Moore & McCormack Co., 298 Fed. 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1923).
16. 340 U.S. 543, 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523 (1951).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1950).
18. See Ryan Distributing Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943)
(claim of damage for patent infringement tried by jury, and petition for
injunction passed on by the court); Ford v. Wilson & Co., 30 F. Supp. 163
(D. Conn. 1939) (legal issue to jury, equitable issue to court); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 39.
19. FED. R. Cr. P. 42 (b).
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Not identical, but somewhat related is the problem, not mentioned
in the FTCA, of whether an insurer as subrogee may sue as a party
plaintiff. The government has contended that the insurer is not the
real party in interest, that the FTCA does not authorize derivative
suits and that the plaintiff-insurer is barred by the Anti-Assignment
statute.20 The Supreme Court in United States v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.21 struck down these arguments and upheld a long line
of lower court decisions22 by ruling that a subrogee is a proper party
plaintiff under the Act. It was there pointed out that the Anti-
Assignment statute does not apply to assignments by operation of
law.
The Supreme Court has established a pattern of liberal interpreta-
tion of the rights of parties under the FTCA in the Aetna and Yellow
Cab cases, 23 a trend which is followed by the instant case. Since the
defendant third-party plaintiff in the instant case would have a
remedy under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the decision is perhaps
even more liberal in permitting impleader than is the Yellow Cab
case.
GIFT TAX- VALUATION -SALE OR REPLACEMENT VALUE
Petitioner purchased jewelry for $49,500 including federal excise tax.
She gave it to her daughter five years later, reporting its value for
gift tax purposes at $50,000. Petitioner then purchased other jewelry
for $240,000, including $40,000 federal excise tax,1 and gave it to her
daughter that same year, reporting a value of $121,000 for gift tax
20. 35 STAT. 411 (1908), 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1927).
21. 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
22. State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.8d 737 (1st
Cir. 1949); United States v. Chicago, RI. & P. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1948); National American Fire Ins. Co. of Omaha v. United States, 171 F.2d
206 (9th Cir. 1948); Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States, 168 F.2d 931 (6th
Cir. 1948); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.
1948); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
594 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd, 171 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948) (insurance company as
subrogee and insured all real parties in interest); Van Wie v. United States,
77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948) (insured real party in interest even though
an insurance company was partially subrogated to the claim). Contra:
United States v. Hill, 171 F.2d 404, judgment modified, 174 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.
1948).
23. "No sensible reason can be imagined why the State, having consented
to be sued, should thus paralyze the remedy." United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554, 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523 (1951), quoting Judge
Cardoza in Anderson v. Hayes Const. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29
(1926).
1. Revenue Act of 1940, § 210, 54 STAT. 522 (1940), as amended by Revenue
Act of 1944, § 302 (a), 58 STAT. 61 (1944). The present provision is contained in
INT. REv. CODE § 1650.
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purposes. The commissioner claimed deficiencies in petitioner's tax
returns. The Tax Court rejected conflicting expert testimony as to
the market value of the jewelry and used as its criterion for valua-
tion the actual sales prices of identical property. Held, affirmed. The
retail cost which includes federal excise tax,2 plus appreciation in
value of the first gift, is the measure of value for gift tax purposes.
Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953).
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax upon the transfer of
property by gift,3 the date of the gift being the critical date of
valuation.4 Value is best established by a supposititious sale between
a willing seller and a willing buyer, both having knowledge of all
relevant facts.5 But whether value is measured by the price the donor
as a vendor would be able to demand, or by the price the donor as
a vendee would have to pay to replace the article, remains largely
undetermined.
Although value is a guess, albeit by informed people,6 and neces-
sarily a matter of opinion,7 there should be a definite method for its
ascertainment. The instant decision relies heavily upon the Gug-
genheim8 case, which held that the value of a single premium life
insurance policy is the cost of the policy to the donor,9 and upon
2. INT. REV. CODE § 2403 (c).
3. "For the calendar year 1940 and each calendar year thereafter a tax,
computed as provided in section 1001, shall be imposed upon the transfer
during such calend-Ar year by any individual, resident or nonresident, of
property by gift." TirI. REv. CODE § 1000 (a).
4. "If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift
shall be considered the amount of the gift." INT. REV. CODE § 1005.
5. "The value of the property is the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or sell. The value of a particular kind of
property is not to be determined by a forced sale. Such value is to be deter-
mined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value at the time of the
gift of each unit of the property." U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19(a) (1943).
This is analogous to property valuation of gross estates for estate tax purposes.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10 (a) (1942). See Goodman v. Commissioner, 156
F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1946).
6. Meadow Land & Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 297 (3d
Cir. 1941).
7. Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
8. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 354, 61 Sup. Ct. 507, 85 L. Ed. 813
(1941). But cf. Helvering v. Bryan, 109 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1940).
9. Three opinions issued the same day by the Supreme Court rejected cash
surrender value as representing the measure of value of a single premium
life insurance policy for gift tax purposes and accepted replacement cost as
the better criterion. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 61 Sup. Ct. 507,
85 L. Ed. 813 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259, 61 Sup. Ct. 509,
85 L. Ed. 817 (1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260, 61 Sup. Ct.
479, 85 L. Ed. 819 (1941). This rationale was later extended to gifts of fully
paid up policies. Houston v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1941);
James H. Lockhart, 46 B.T.A. 426 (1942). It has also been applied in the
estate tax field. Richard C. DuPont, 18 T.C. 1134 (1952).
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the Gould0 and Duke" cases which held that the value for gift tax
purposes is the purchase price plus federal excise tax. The taxpayers
in the latter two cases, however, did not dispute the use of cost as
determinative of value, but questioned only the inclusion of the
federal excise tax in the valuation. In all three cases the gifts were
made within a week of the purchase, which showed intent at the time
of the purchase to make a gift. Certainly when the article is purchased
with the intent to make a gift, cost should be the primary criterion.12
But should it be the sole criterion in all instances? Although cost is
a factor,13 commentators generally agree that the value of property
is primarily to be determined by the price it will bring the donor,
14
or, as Judge Frank defined it, "what-you-could-have-got-for-it-in-
money-if-you-had-sold-it."' 5
Valuation of property included in a decedent's gross estate is
similar in principle to the valuation of property transferred by gift.'0
The amount of the estate tax is measured by the sale value of the
property,17 without suggestion that cost is the primary basis of valua-
tion. Indeed, it would be unfair for an estate to be taxed upon cost
as the value where that exceeds the current sale value. Of additional
significance in analyzing value is the approval by the courts of of the
"blockage" rule of gifts of stock.'8 Buying a large block of stock would
raise the price to a premium; "blockage," however, recognizes that
a large block of stock cannot be converted into cash as readily as a
few shares and allows the donor to value his stock at a lower price
than the sum of the stocks multiplied by the current exchange rate
10. Frank Miller Gould, 14 T.C. 414 (1950).
11. Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U. S. 906 (1953).
12. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 61 Sup. Ct. 507, 85 L. Ed. 813
(1941).
13. 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 1309 (1942).
14. "Some courts have apparently construed market value in substantial
accordance with the orthodox definition of economists. That is to say, the
value of a given property is taken to mean the highest price for which the
owner could sell it. . . ." 1 BONBRiGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 56 (1937).
"[I]n practice, valuations are made on the basis of what such effects would
bring at public sale rather than upon the basis of cost to the decedent... "
2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE Am GIFT TAXATION 1240 (1942). See Gordon, What
is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAX L. REv. 35, 36 (1952).
15. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1943). See 1
BONBRIGHT, VALUATION or PROPERTY 134 (1937).
16. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10 (a) (1942); MONTGOMERY, 1951-52 FEDERAL
TAXES--ESTATES, TRUSTS Am Gnvs 1041 (1952); 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 993 (1942).
17. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935). "The purpose
of the estate tax law is to tax the property passing at death at its cash
equivalent which is the price it would bring if sold for cash. . . . Market
value then . . . means the saleable value . . . of the taxable property."
HUGHES, THE FEDERA DEATH TAX 263 (1939).
18. 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1282 (1942).
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on the market. 19 Thus, value is measured by the money for which
the donor could sell his stock.
These established rules throw doubt upon making cost synonymous
with value. The retail price includes the expected profits and earnings
which involve labor, expenses and time. These are not capitalized
upon to the same extent when the vendee seeks to resell the article.
Where property originally acquired for the personal use of the owner
is subsequently given away, it seems fair and just that the value should
be the price for which it can be sold rather than its replacement cost.
Once the premise that cost is the primary basis of value is held in-
applicable, the federal excise tax should not be considered in value,
as its utility depends upon cost being the determinative factor.20
LIFE INSURANCE- WAR CLAUSE- KOREAN CONFLICT
Decedent's contract of life insurance with defendant company
provided double indemnity for accidental death except while the
insured was in the military forces of a country at war. When insured
was killed in Korea, defendant company refused to pay double in-
demnity on the grounds that the Korean conflict was a war within
the meaning of the exclusionary provision. Held, judgment for the
defendant. The contracting parties in using the term "war" intended
a "shooting war," and did not contemplate the necessity of a formal
declaration by Congress. Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
A large number of life insurance policies and practically all double
indemnity or accidental death benefit riders contain a war clause,
which is usually one of two types--a "result" clause, limiting recov-
ery when death is the result of war, or a "status" clause by which
indemnity is restricted if the insured is killed at any time while in
the armed services of a country at war.1 In either instance a defini-
tion of war is requisite to a determination of the applicability of the
clause, and as a result of the traditional ambiguity in which that
term is steeped, the problem has been a prolific breeding ground for
litigation.2 The courts which have thus far considered the problem
19. Groff v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 319 (D. Conn. 1940). "Blockage" is discussed
in 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girt TAxATIoN 1280 (1942); see also Peters,
The Fair Market Value of Blocks of Stock, 17 TAXES 17 (1939).
20. Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
906 (1953).
1. See Wheeler, The War Clause, 370 INs. L.J. 727 (1953).
2. The meaning of war, as the term is applicable in the war clause, is
particularly susceptible to ambiguity and litigation in two historic situations:
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fall into two categories: those which give to war its realistic meaning,
"a shooting war";3 and those which define the term in its so-called
legal sense, requiring formal declaration by Congress. 4
The "legal" definition appears to have evolved from cases which
interpreted "war" in terms of public law, wherein its existence is
said to be a question for determination by political departments of
government, binding on the courts in all matters of state and public
(1) When the death of the insured occurs during a period of armed hostility
which has not been formally declared war; the Pearl Harbor Cases: New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946); Savage v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944); Rosenau v.
Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944); West v. Palmetto
State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475, 145 A.L.R. 1461 (1943); Pang
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaiian Rep. 208, 14 C.C.H. LIFE CAS.
496 (1945)-the cases growing out of the Korean conflict: Stanbery v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A.2d 134 (L. 1953); Harding v. Pennsyl-
vania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa. Super. 236, 90 A.2d 589 (1952), 26 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 328 (1953), a'd, 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221 (1953); Beley v. Pennsyl-
vania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa. Super. 253, 90 A.2d 597 (1952), 28 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 899 (1953), af'd, 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953); Western Reserve Life
Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 1 C.C.H. LIFE CAs.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App., Oct. 7, 1953);
Grey v. Southern Aid Life Ins. Co., 15 C.C.H. LinE CAS. 507 (Munic. Ct. D.C.,
June 5, 1952).
(2) When death occurs after the cessation of hostilities of a declared war
and prior to a formal treaty: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d
874 (10th Cir. 1948); Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C.
Cir. 1948); Mutual Life Ins. Vo. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E.2d 571
(1949); Trimble v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 83 Ohio App. 102, 82
N.E.2d 548 (1948); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Leverett, 215 S.W.2d
939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Thompson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 13 C.C.H.
LIFE CAs. 235 (Greenville County, S.C., C.P. 1947).
Other war clause cases in which the meaning of war has been the point of
controversy involve deaths resulting from conflicts between two foreigrk
nations: Vanderbilt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248, 184 N.Y. Supp. 54
(Sup. Ct. 1920), affd, 202 App. Div. 738, 194 N.Y. Supp. 986 (1st Dep't 1922);
Hopkins v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 76, 121 N.E. 465 (1918)
(the Lusitania cases). See also Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass,
366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942) (an American ship escorting a convoy bound for
England, prior to our entrance into W. W. II was torpedoed by a German
submarine).
3. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948); Stinson
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 79
Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E.2d 571 (1949); Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312
Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942); Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super.
498, 98 A.2d 134 (L. 1953); Vanderbilt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248,
184 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1920), af'd, 202 App. Div. 738, 194 N.Y. Supp.
986 (Ist Dep't 1922); Hopkins v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.
76, 121 N.E. 465 (1918); Grey v. Southern Aid Life Ins. Co., 15 C.C.H. LIFE:
CAs. 507 (Munic. Ct. D.C., June 5, 1952); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
Meadows, 1 C.C.H. LIFE CAs.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App., Oct. 7, 1953).
4. Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.
1944); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944);
Trimble v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 83 Ohio App. 102, 82 N.E.2d
548 (1948); Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d
221 (1953); Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d
202 (1953); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475
(1943); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Leverett, 215 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948); Thompson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 13 C.C.H. Lim CAS.
235 (Greenville County, S.C. C.P. 1947); Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada, 37 Hawaiian Rep. 208, 15 C.C.H. LmFE CAS. 496 (1945).
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concern.5 Many of these cases, however, indicate that a state of war
can exist without a formal declaration thereof.0 That a political
determination of the existence of war should not be controlling in the
insurance cases is further evidenced by the fact that the insurance
policy is not a matter of public concern,7 but rather a private contract,
to the terms of which the parties may give any meaning inoffensive
to public policy.8
When the intent of the parties is not clear, ambiguity is resolved
by the application of appropriate rules of contract interpretation and
construction. Certain of these standards have been invoked in the
war clause cases in support of both the legal and the realistic inter-
pretations. The Restatement suggests three categories of rules: stand-
ards, primary rules and secondary rules.9 The "standard" generally
applied to the integrated or written contract, such as the contract
of insurance, is that of limited usage, i.e., "the ordinary meaning of
the writing to parties of the kind who contracted at the time and
place where the contract was made and- with such circumstances as
surrounded its making."'1 Applying this standard, the court in
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis" placed itself in the position pf the
parties and concluded that the obvious purpose of the war clause was
to avoid liability under the increased hazards of a shooting war, not
to designate certain legislative or executive acts which would initiate
and terminate liability. If after application of the limited usage test,
ambiguity subsists the standard of reasonable expectation-that mean-
ing which the person using the words could reasonably expect the
other party to give them-is to be applied.& 2 Some courts, however,
have considered that when the law gives to certain words an estab-
5. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 40
Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194 (1919); Verano v. De Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp.
954 (D.C. Pa. 1941); Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 294 (1866) (considered
to be the leading case).
6. Bas v. Tingy, 4 fall. 37, 1 L. Ed. 731 (U.S. 1800); Prize Cases, 2 Black
635, 17 L. Ed. 459 (U.S. 1862); Verano v. De Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp.
954 (D.C. Pa. 1941); Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 Fed. 445 (D. Kan. 1905);
but see Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 294 (1866).
7. That an insurance policy is a private contract, subject to the ordinary
rules of contract interpretation, see 13 APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRAc-
TICE § 7381 (1943) (citing cases from almost every jurisdiction).
8. To the effect that the war clause is not contrary to public policy, see
Miller v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310, 7 A.L.R. 378
(1919); Railey v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 Ga. App. 269, 106 S.E.
203 (1921); Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 225 S.W. 106 (Mo. App. 1920).
See also 3 WLISTON, CONMCTS § 610 (Revised ed. 1936).
9. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 227 (1932), which suggests six possible"standards" of interpretation which may be applied to words and other
manifestations of intention in order to determine the meaning to be given
them. See also 3 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 603 (Revised ed. 1936).
10. 3 WIMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 607 (Revised ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 230 (1932).
11. 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E.2d 571 (1949).
12. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 231 (1932).
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lished meaning, that meaning is less readily controlled by standards
of interpretation otherwise applicable than is the meaning of other
words.'3 This reasoning has been used to justify the legal interpreta-
tion,14 notwithstanding war has not an established meaning in the law.
To aid in the application of the appropriate standard there are
certain primary rules of interpretation which may be applied.1'
Among these rules is the one used in the instant case which justifies
the "realistic" approach, i.e., "the ordinary meaning of language
throughout the country is given to words unless circumstances show
that a different meaning is applicable."'16 It would seem that to the
extent that the aplicable standard is kept in mind this rule is appro-
priately invoked in the war clause situation and the realistic inter-
pretation, which is the result of the proper application of the rule, is
sound. When, and only when, the primary rules fail to resolve an
ambiguity, may resort be had to certain secondary rules of interpreta-
tion.17 It is in this category that Williston and the Restatement place
the familiar rule of strict interpretation against the insurer, 8 used all
too frequently in justification of the legal definition by courts which
ignore the other rules first to be applied.19
Although the realistic interpretation, adopted by the court in the
instant case, appears sound in theory, it does, in this type of case at
least,2 0 work a forfeiture of the insurance, a policy feature of the
rule which may well result in the continued use by many courts of
the legal interpretation in cases arising out of the Korean conflict.
A policy consideration, not so readily apparent in the individual case,
is the fact that the tremendous losses to the insurance companies
which may result from wide-spread adoption of the legal interpreta-
13. RESTATEMAENT, CONTRACTS § 234 (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 614
(Revised ed. 1936).
14. Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944).
15. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 235 (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
618 (Revised ed. 1936).
16. RESTATEVNT, CONTRACTS § 235 (1932); see also 3 WMLIrSTOX, CONTRACTS
§ 618 (Revised ed. 1936).
17. RESTATEmNT, CONTRATS §236 (1932).
18. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236 (1932); 3 WILISTOX, CONTRACTS § 621
(Revised ed. 1936).
19. Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944);
Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221 (1953);
Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953); Pang
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaiian Rep. 208, 14 C.C.H. LIFE CAS.
496 (1945). "The necessity for construction arises only when, after giving
the language used its ordinary and usual meaning, there still remains an
ambiguity in the contract. In such cases the ambiguity is resolved.., against
the insurer and in favor of the insured." Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
137 F.2d 386, 391 (8th Cir. 1943).
20. In the reverse situation, when death occurs after the cessation of hos-
tilities of a declared war and prior to a formal treaty (see note 2 supra), the




tion, must ultimately be borne by the public. So it would seem that
the realistic approach may well be as sound on policy grounds as it
is in theory. The whole problem, of course, suggests the need for a
uniform war clause which will be given uniform construction.
TENNESSEE PROCEDURE - RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CHANCERY -
PURELY EQUITABLE SUIT
Complainants sued in chancery court to enjoin defendants from
soliciting personal injury claims on behalf of certain attorneys. A
jury, empaneled upon demand of defendants, found that defendants
were not guilty of illegal solicitation; the chancellor approved the
verdict and dismissed the bill. Complainants appealed, contending
that as the determinative facts were undisputed, the chancellor was
under a duty to withdraw the issue from the jury and upon the un-
contradicted evidence should have allowed the injunction. Held, re-
versed and injunction granted. There is no right to trial by jury in
chancery court of a purely equitable cause. Doughty v. Grills, 260
S.W. 2d 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. 1952).
In Tennessee there is no constitutional1 or common-law right2 to
trial by jury in an equity case. However, by statute$ Tennessee gives
either party, upon timely application, a right to jury trial on all
material, disputed facts "save in cases involving complicated account-
ing ... and those elsewhere excepted by law or by provisions of this
Code. ... ,,4 Where the right to a jury exists under this statute the
trial is to be conducted as if it were a suit at law,5 with the introduc-
tion of oral testimony and with the verdict binding upon the court.e
1. The constitutional provision that the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, refers only to actions triable at common law, not to suits brought in
chancery. TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 6. See, e.g., Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 617,
184 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1943); Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 10, 80 S.W.2d 666, 669
(1934); Exum v. Griffis Newbern Co., 144 Tenn. 239, 249-54, 230 S.W. 601,
603-05 (1921) (collects cases); Jackson, Morris & Co. v. Nhnmo & Thornhill,
71 Tenn. 597, 613-14 (1879); Thfrd National Bank v. American Equitable Ins.
Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 257, 178 S.W.2d 915, 919 (M.S. 1943); Greene County
Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 244, 75 S.W.2d 49, 52 (E.S. 1934);
see also GmsoN, Surrs 3N CHAxcERY § 548 (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover,
1937).
2. See Miller v. Washington County, 143 Tenn. 488, 500, 226 S.W. 199, 202
(1920); State ex rel. Mynatt v. King, 137 Tenn. 17, 28, 191 S.W. 352, 354
(1917); Greene County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 244, 75 S.W.2d
49, 52 (E.S. 1934) (right to jury in chancery is statutory).
3. TzNN. CODE ANN. §§ 10574-80 (Williams 1934).
4. Id. § 10574.
5. Id. § 10579.
6. When under this statute a jury is granted, the fact issues are tried accord-
ing to the forms of law and the jury's verdict has the same force as at law.
E.g., Davis v. Mitchell, 27 Tenn. App. 182, 196, 178 S.W.2d 889, 895 (W.S.
19541
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This section of the Code fails to make clear the type of case in
chancery which is intended to be excepted from the operation of
the statute and retained under the traditional equity procedure. When
it is considered that traditionally equity allowed a jury only at the
discretion of the chancellor,7 that the jury verdict is advisory only,"
and that on appeal the case is tried de novo,9 the importance of this
failure of the Code becomes apparent.
Is the statutory right to jury trial in a purely equitable cause in
chancery court denied by the clause "save in cases . . . elsewhere
excepted by law"? In Hunt v. Hunt,0 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
interpreting this statute held that constitutional provisions regarding
jury trials did not apply to cases of an equitable nature, that the
statute itself exempted from its operation certain cases, and that
hence the chancellor has a much broader latitude in withdrawing
issues from a jury than the circuit judge has in directing a verdict.
That decision then is not that there is no right to a jury trial in suits
of an equitable nature" but that when a certain quantum of evidence
is required to establish an equity claim (clear and convincing evidence
to establish a parol trust in land, in the Hunt case), it is the duty of
the chancellor before submitting the case to the jury to determine if
the evidence presented meets this requirement.12 If there is clear and
convincing evidence, it must be submitted to the jury even if there
is other evidence, which if believed, would contradict the clear and
convincing evidence.'3
The court in the instant case interprets the Hunt decision as hold-
ing that cases of purely equitable cognizance are within the exception
1943); Ray v. Crain, 18 Tenn. App. 603, 608, 80 S.W.2d 113, 117 (M.S. 1934);
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. American Trust Co., 17 Tenn. App. 516,
528, 68 S.W. 2d 971, 978 (M.S. 1933); Johnson v. Graves, 15 Tenn. App. 466,
475 (W.S. 1932). The jury's verdict was also binding under the Codes of
1858 and 1896. McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 332, 59 S.W. 1025, 1028 (1900).
7. See Greene County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 244, 75
S.W.2d 49, 52 (E.S. 1934).
8. GIBSON, SuITs n CHANCERY, § 554a (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover,
1937).
9. Id. § 1269d(3).
10. 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1934).
11. If the required quantum of evidence has been presented there is a
right to a jury verdict even on a purely equitable claim. Greenwood v.
Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 231 S.W.2d 315 (1950). Query, is the holding of the
instant case consistent with this holding?
12. Under the chancery practice of submitting special issues of fact to
the jury, the chancellor has an affirmative duty to withdraw from the jury
all undisputed and immaterial facts. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 167
Tenn. 606, 613, 72 S.W.2d 778, 780 (1934); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Strong, 19
Tenn. App. 404, 409, 89 S.W. 267 (M.S. 1936); c.f. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn.
1, 10, 80 S.W. 2d 666, 669 (1934). "There is always room for judgment upon
the part of the Chancellor as to whether the points in dispute are so free
from complication that jury may decide them." GIBsoN, SuITs 3N CHANCERY
§ 548 (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
13. Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 612, 231 S.W.2d 315, 320 (1950).
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to the statute and that the traditional equity proceedings of chancery
are to be applied. Upon this interpretation of the Hunt decision,
the instant case further explains the "elsewhere excepted by law"
clause as meaning those cases elsewhere excepted by the common
law.14 Pure equity suits within the inherent jurisdiction of chancery
court, such as suits for injunctions, are thus excepted because in equity
cases there is no common-law right of trial by jury. The common-law
rule of no right in either party to trial by jury of a purely equitable
cause in chancery, which was changed by the Act of 1846,15 is by
this decision again made the law in Tennessee.
The secondary basis for the instant decision was that no determina-
tive fact had been disputed, hence the chancellor was under a duty
to decide the facts without submission to a jury.16 Although the de-
fendant introduced no evidence to contradict complainant's case, he
raised by skillful cross-examination of complainant's witnesses a
question of credibility. If the court concedes for the sake of argument
that there was a right to a jury trial, the credibility of witnesses is
the type of determination to which juries are particularly adapted.17
It is doubtful that a judge in a law court would have directed a ver-
dict in the face of this disputed testimony.
Thus this interpretation of the Hunt case returns Tennessee chan-
cery practice to its former equity procedure. However, it is doubtful
that the supreme court in the Hunt case intended to hold that there
was absolutely no right to a jury in a purely equitable cause in
chancery. The importance of the instant decision is that it allows all
equitable cases which are within the inherent jurisdiction of chancery
to come within the statutory exception of "elsewhere excepted by
law," rather than limiting that exception to those cases which fail to
meet the quantum of evidence required to establish certain equitalbe
claims.
14. Instant case, 260 S.W.2d at 386-87.
15. This act was the first of a series of statutes authorizing the chancellor
to empanel a jury for "any issue of fact involved in any case pending in said
[chancery] courts-the finding of which shall be final and conclusive....
Tenn. Acts 1946, c. 122, § 14.
16. Instant case, 260 S.W.2d at 387.
17. "[T]he main reason for trial by jury [in chancery] is the . . . impor-
tance of an open and rigid cross-examination of the witnesses in the presence
of the Court and jury." GIBSON, Sumrs IN CHANcERY, § 548 (4th ed., Higgins
and Crownover, 1937).
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TRADE-MARKS- INFRINGEMENT AS UNFAIR COMPETITION-
APPLICATION OF LANHAM ACT
Plaintiff, manufacturer of men's wear since 1922, had used the name
"Hyde Park" as a trade-mark. Defendant, manufacturer of women's
wear, had used the identical mark since 1945. Plaintiff brought suit
charging infringement of a registered trade-mark and unfair com-
petition. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed. Held
(2-1),' affirmed under either state2 or federal law; the similarity
has caused no confusion in the trade and the purchasing public has
not been mislead into believing that plaintiff is the source or origin
of defendant's merchandise. Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park
Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 46
(1953).
With the defects and uncertainties of prior law and the need for a
uniform federal trade-mark law in mind,4 Congress in 1946 passed
the Lanham Act5 which embodied many of the provisions of the
prior statutes and much of the case law on the subject. Its stated
purpose was "to regulate commerce within the control of Congress
by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in
such commerce . . . to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such
commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or color-
able imitations of registered marks. . . ." These statements indicate
1. Judge Clark dissents vigorously, contending that the Lanham Act is
controlling, and by the application of its test, unfair competition must be
found. Instant case, 204 F.2d at 226.
2. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360 et seq. See Time, Inc. v. Life Color Labora-
tory, Inc., 279 App. Div. 51, 106 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y.
965, 106 N.E.2d 56 (1952).
3. The Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051
et seq. (1948).
4. The basic trade-mark act until 1946 was the Act of 1905. 33 STAT. 724
(1905), as amended, 52 STAT. 638 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 81 et seq. (1948).
This Act, in establishing a federal law of trade-marks, adopted as its criterion
for trade-mark infringement a "same descriptive properties" test: "Any
person who shall . .. reproduce . . . or colorably imitate any such trade-
mark and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those set forth in the registration . . . shall be liable to an
action for damages therefor." 33 STAT. 728 (1905). See Moore, Trade-Mark
Problems and Trade-Mark Laws, 7 BROo xN L. Rav. 20 (1937); Robertson
and Morey, Desirable Changes in Trade-Mark Laws, 5 JoHx MAnSHALL L.Q.
570 (1940).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. 60 STAT. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (1948). "The purpose underlying
any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product it asks for and wants to get.
Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and
money m presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his invest-
ment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats." S=". REP. No. 1333,




that Congress intended to afford to trade-marks a protection over
and beyond the tests and considerations previously employed. These
were: (1) palming off goods as those of another;7 (2) tarnishing of
reputation;s (3) false impression of a trade connection; 9 (4) bad
faith diversion of customers;10 (5) right to normal expansion of busi-
ness;1 (6) dilution of trade-mark; 2 (7) confusion of source.'3
The test set out by Section 32 (1) of the Lanham Act is whether use
of the trade-mark is "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods."'14 This section
was heralded by commentators as adopting, as the sole test of in-
fringement, the "Hand Doctrine,"' 5 which extended trade-mark pro-
tection to the use of a copied mark on noncompeting goods where the
7. Hiram Walker & Sons v. Pennsylvania-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836
(2d Cir. 1935); Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159
Misc. 551 288 N.Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
8. Cf. iFord Motor Co. v. C. N. Cady Co., Inc., 124 Misc. 678, 681, 208 N.Y.
Supp. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1925), modified, 216 App. Div. 786, 214 N.Y. Supp. 838
(4th Dep't 1926).
9. Cf. Phillips v. Governor & Co. of Adventurers of England Trading into
Hudson's Bay, 79 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1935); Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co.,
22 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1927); Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland
Co., 273 Fed. 674 (3d Cir. 1921); Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247
Fed. 658 (6th Cir. 1917).
10. See Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
11. Forsythe Co., Inc. v. Forsythe Shoe Corp., 234 App. Div. 355, 254 N.Y.
Supp. 584 (1st Dep't 1932), modified, 259 N.Y. 248, 181 N.E. 467 (1932); Long's
Hat Stores Corp. v. Long's Clothes, Inc., 224 App. Div. 497, 231 N.Y. Supp.
107 (1st Dep't 1928).
12. See Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), af'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933); Schecter,
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813 (1927).
13. Some type of affirmative relief was granted in the following cases:
Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934) (fountain pens and razor
blades); Del Monte Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F.2d
774 (9th Cir. 1929) (food products and oleomargarine); Duro Co. v. Duro
Co., 27 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1928) (electrical engines and spark plugs); Wall
v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (automobiles and
radio tubes); Alfred Dunhill of London v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp.
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (cigarettes and shirts); Standard Oil Co. v. California
Peach & Fig Growers, Inc., 28 F.2d 283 (D. Del. 1928) (mineral and figs);
Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Hudson Tire Co., 21 F.2d 453 (D.N.J. 1927) (auto-
mobiles and tires); Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Sargoy Bros. & Co.,
276 Fed. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) (cooking utensils and wash boilers); Omega
Oil Co. v. Weschler, 35 Misc. 441, 71 N.Y. Supp. 983 (Sup. Ct. 1901), aff'd, 68
App. Div. 638, 74 N.Y. Supp. 1140 (1st Dep't 1902) (soap and liniment).
14. 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (1948).
15. This doctrine was laid down by Judge Learned Hand in Yale Electric
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928). The court refused registration
of the mark "Yale" for flashlights when opposed by the owner of the same
mark for locks and keys. This doctrine could not be said to represent the
weight of authority prior to the passage of the Lanham Act. Walgreen Drug
Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311"
U.S. 708 (1940); Beechnut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967 (3d
Cir. 1925); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliot, 7 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1925); Atlas
Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398 (8th Cir. 1913); Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. Rohrlich, 73 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolz-
berg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 715-40
(1938).
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article bearing the copied symbol was a product which might reason-
ably be expected to have come from the original owner of the mark.
The courts in applying this test recognized two rights in a trade-mark
owner: (1) the right to protect his reputation which was subject to
injury if another used the mark and marketed an inferior product, 0
and (2) the right to reasonable expansion of his mark to other prod-
ucts.1
7
From the beginning, some courts refused to apply the statutory
test as broadly as Congress apparently intended. In California Fruit
Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co.,'L it was held that between
noncompetitive products there can be no confusion of source. This
conclusion was reached after a consideration of the defendant's in-
terests and the monopoly power that would be given to the plaintiff
if an injunction were granted. 9
The instant case is the same in effect as the Sunkist case, although
here there was never any conclusion as to "likelihood of confusion."
The absence of actual confusion was apparently taken as conclusive
as to the absence of likelihood of confusion. Since the policy of the
Act is to increase the recognition and protection given to trademarks
and to obviate confusion, the instant case would seem incongruent
in that the broad statutory test of Section 32 (1) is without reference
to the existence of actual competition, which factor, however, may be
relevant in determining likelihood of confusion.
The Supreme Court should clarify the situation so that trade-mark
owners may have definite rights uniformly enforceable upon a
national scale.20 If policy considerations such as the fear of monopoly
or unreasonable limitations on business opportunity are found to
lead to a contrary rule, then the statute should be amended.
16. Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Stevens, 15 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1926); see
Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir.
1943); Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853, 855 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943).
17. See Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., supra note 16, at
825; Finchley, Inc. v. Finchley Co., 40 F.2d 736, 738 (D. Md. 1929). But see
Walgreen Drug Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., supra note 15, at 963.
18. 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947) (fruit products and bread).
19. Ibid. See also instant case, 204 F.2d at 225; Hall, Possible Monopoly
Implications in the Trade-Mark Bill, 32 GEO. L.J. 171 (1944).
20. See Lunsford, Trade-Mark Infringement and Confusion of Source:
Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REv. 214 (1949).
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